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Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an un-
trusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84)
QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical com-
munication (LOCC) adversaries. Here, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV
protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust
against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is
secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss
limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser
sources and linear optics. In this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive
constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can one verify that an untrusted party (someone
with no credentials) is indeed at a particular geographical
location? In cryptography, this problem is closely related
to the task of position verification, where a prover P has
to convince a set of remote verifiers V1, V2, . . . , that he or
she is at a certain geographic position pos∗ [1]. At the end
of the task, the verifiers either agree or disagree with the
prover: agreement means the prover gains a geographical
credential, while disagreement means the prover remains
with zero credentials. Beyond position verification, such
geographical credentials can also be used to build other
cryptographic tasks like authentication and key distribu-
tion [2].
In the classical setting, it has been shown that po-
sition verification is insecure against unbounded adver-
saries [1]. This impasse is mainly due to the fact that col-
luding adversaries can retrieve, store, and share classical
challenges with each other. One solution is to adopt the
so-called bounded-retrieval model and limit the amount of
information that an adversary can retrieve from the pub-
lic channel [1]. However, this model is difficult to justify
in practice. Drawing insights from the bounded-retrieval
model, researchers proposed quantum position verifica-
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tion (QPV) as a means to achieve information-theoretic
security [2–7]. The basic idea is to replace classical chal-
lenges with quantum challenges (quantum states) and
utilize the quantum no-cloning principle to bound the
amount of retrievable information. Unfortunately, this
intuition is not enough to guarantee unconditional se-
curity in the quantum setting, as colluding adversaries
can make use of preshared entanglement to perform non-
local computation with one round of classical communi-
cation [2, 7–10]. In light of these impossibility results, the
most obvious solution is to consider adversaries with no
preshared entanglement, a scenario that is known as the
NPE-model [2]. Assuming perfect channel transmittance,
the Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol has
been proven secure against the NPE-model [2], and more
generally against adversaries with linearly bounded en-
tanglement [10–13].
In the case of high quantum channel loss, it turns out
that the situation is much more constrained. In particu-
lar, it has been shown that BB84 QPV is highly vulner-
able against loss-dependent attacks and is insecure after
the 3 db loss point [14]. This weakness is in part due to
the design of the verification challenge. To see this, recall
that in BB84 QPV, one verifier V1 sends a qubit prepared
in one of the four BB84 states to the prover P , while the
other verifier V2 sends the basis information. Then, the
prover is asked to extract the encoded bit from the qubit
using the received basis information. Now, if the quan-
tum channel loss is sufficiently high, then the adversaries
can break the protocol with the following local operations
and classical communication (LOCC) attack. First, the
adversary nearest to V1 (called E1) measures V1’s qubit
in a randomly chosen basis and sends the measurement
result and the basis choice to the other adversary E2, who
is located next to V2. Likewise, E2 duplicates the basis
information of V2 and sends a copy to E1. Finally, the
adversaries report E1’s measurement outcome to their
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FIG. 1. Relativistic constraints. We assume that all quan-
tum and classical signals travel at the speed of light and that
the speed of light is normalized to unity. In this case, the time
required to send a message from one position to another po-
sition is equal to the Euclidean distance between them. More
specifically, the Euclidean distance between pos1 and pos
∗ is
defined as d(pos1, pos
∗) where d(·, ·) is the distance measure
in R. The protocol is based on a N -fold sequential repetition
setting, where the verifiers only send out their qubit states at
intervals of ti+1 − ti = 2d(pos1, pos∗) = 2d(pos∗, pos2). Note
that for simplicity we assume the prover is located at the
center.
respective verifiers if the basis choices of E1 and V2 are
the same. Otherwise, they claim no detection. Evidently,
this attack works whenever the quantum channel loss is
greater than 1/2, thus implying a 3 dB loss limit. More
crucially, this means that BB84 QPV is not useful in
practice as most free space quantum communication sys-
tems have more than 3 dB loss [15].
One way to overcome the above limitation is to go be-
yond the BB84 encoding scheme and encode the qubits
in more than two bases. More concretely, if the number
of possible encoding bases is N , then the above LOCC
attack can only succeed with probability 1/N . Following
this intuition, it has been shown that multi-basis QPV
using weak laser sources is secure against specific LOCC
attacks up to 13 dB loss and 0.01 quantum bit error
rate [14]. Another solution is to use quantum memories
and separate the quantum transmission phase from the
(classical) basis distribution phase [6]. That is, the quan-
tum challenge (a collection of quantum states) is first
delivered to the prover and stored in a quantum mem-
ory. Then, the verifiers only send the classical challenge
after the prover confirms that the quantum challenge has
been received. Thus assuming perfect classical commu-
nication, the protocol is essentially secure against loss-
dependent attacks. However, such protocol may require
long-lived quantum memories.
Here, we present a QPV protocol that is secure against
LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss. The
protocol is based on the concept of measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [16]
and uses time-reversed entanglement swapping to check
for quantum correlations [17]. The basic idea is that if
the prover is indeed at the claimed position, then he or
she should be able to perform a local entangling mea-
surement on the verifiers’ BB84 qubits and create quan-
tum correlations between them (as in entanglement swap-
ping). However, if the prover is dishonest and is not at
the claimed position, then by definition he or she can only
collude with other dishonest provers to perform LOCC
measurements on the qubits. In this case, no quantum
correlations can be created between the verifiers. There-
fore, by comparing the measured error rate against some
tolerated error rate, the verifiers can check if the prover
is at the claimed position or not. Furthermore, like MDI-
QKD, our QPV protocol does not require quantum mem-
ories and can be implemented with weak laser sources,
linear optics and standard single photon detectors.
For practical reasons, we consider the sequential multi-
round setting where the verifiers only send out their
BB84 qubits after receiving the measurement outcome
from the previous round. In this setting, the standard
relativistic constraints (see Fig. (1)) only apply to each
individual round. One of the main advantages of sequen-
tial multi-round is that the adversaries are limited to
independent attacks (also known as collective attacks in
quantum cryptography), which greatly simplifies the se-
curity analysis. However, sequential multi-round setting
includes the possibility that the adversaries could use the
first round to distribute entanglement for later rounds
and break the protocol. To rule out such a possibility, the
most consistent solution, arguably, is to assume LOCC
adversaries, which by definition precludes the distribu-
tion of entanglement at any point in the protocol. Al-
ternatively, we can also keep the NPE-model and fur-
ther assume the adversaries lose their entanglement at
the start of every round. In this work, we consider secu-
rity against LOCC adversaries and leave the security of
NPE-model for future work. Here, it is implicit that se-
curity against LOCC adversaries means security against
LOCC attacks that are compatitible with the underly-
ing relativistic constraints (i.e., those with one round of
classical communication).
The paper is organized as follows. For pedagogical rea-
sons, in Section II we first present the details of our
QPV protocol with ideal BB84 qubit states (called Pro-
tocol I). Then, in Section III we analyze the security of
our qubit protocol against LOCC adversaries. In Section
IV, we extend Protocol I to weak laser sources based on
the decoy-state method [18] (called Protocol II) and de-
rive its security bound. Finally in Section VI, we conclude
with a discussion on possible future work.
3II. QUBIT PROTOCOL
For simplicity, we consider the one dimensional sce-
nario where everyone is positioned on a straight line. In
this scenario, the verifiers are assumed to have access to a
private classical channel [19] and each verifier is equipped
with a local source of randomness and a trusted BB84
qubit preparation device. More specifically, each qubit
preparation device accepts two bits k1, k2 as an input
and generates ωk1,k2 using
ω0,0 :=
I+ X
2
, ω0,1 :=
I− X
2
,
ω1,0 :=
I+ Y
2
, ω1,1 :=
I− Y
2
,
where X and Y (together with Z) are the standard Pauli
matrices. Our QPV protocol is framed in a m-fold se-
quential repetition picture and is characterized by two
threshold parameters, i.e., the tolerated number of de-
tection events, nth, and the tolerated error rate, δth <
1/4. The protocol concludes by outputting either {Y, N},
where Y means agreement and N means disagreement. Be-
low, we describe our protocol in more detail.
Protocol with ideal BB84 qubits
1. Preparation. The preparation phase is carried out
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m times, one after the other. In each ith run, the
verifiers first use the private classical channel to generate a
random basis choice bi. Then, they each generate a random
bit (which we denote by xi and yi, respectively) and use it to
prepare a qubit and send it to the prover. The transmission
is synchronized in such a way that the qubits reach pos∗ at
time ti + τ , where τ = d(pos1, pos
∗) = d(pos∗, pos2), i.e., see
Fig. (1).
2. Measurement. The prover makes an entangling measure-
ment on ωbi,xi ⊗ ω′bi,yi and obtains one of the three possible
outcomes, zi ∈ {0, 1,∅}. The outcome is then reported to
the verifiers.
3. Quota check. The verifiers accept the measurement
outcome zi only if it arrives in time. If one of the outcomes
does not arrive in time or the verifiers receive different
outcomes, they abort the protocol and output N. If the
protocol does not abort at the end of the measurement
phase, the verifiers perform a quota check : they calculate
s1,1 = |Z|, where Z = {i : zi 6= ∅}, and check if s1,1 ≥ nth.
If the check is positive, they select a random subset Z ′ of
size nth from Z. Otherwise, they abort and output N.
4. Verification. Conditioned on passing the quota check, the
verifiers compute the error rate and check if
Let us first present an optical implementation based
on single-photon sources and linear optics which shows
that the above protocol is cryptographically complete
(see Section III for a brief discussion and Ref. [1] for
a more formal definition). Starting from the preparation
phase, the verifiers each use their randomly generated bit
δˆtest =
r1,1
s1,1
≤ δth,
where r1,1 = |E| and E = {i : zi 6= xi ⊕ yi|zi ∈ Z ′}. If the
check is positive, they agree with the prover and output Y,
otherwise they output N.
Protocol I. QPV with BB84 qubits.
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FIG. 2. BSM based on linear optics. A successful Bell
state measurement corresponds to the following detection pat-
terns: a coincident detection in D1H and D2V , or in D1V and
D2H , indicates a projection into the Bell state |Ψ−〉, while
a click in D1H and D1V , or in D2H and D2V , reveals a
projection into the Bell state |Ψ+〉
values (k1, k2) to prepare one of the four possible polar-
ized single-photon states, {(|H〉 + (i)k1(−1)k2 |V 〉)/√2},
and send it to the prover. Assuming linear optics, the
prover can implement a Bell-state measurement (BSM)
with 1/2 efficiency, i.e., one that is capable of discrimi-
nating between two Bell states [20, 21] (see Fig. (2)). In
this case, the expected error rate and detection rate are
0 and 1/2, respectively. That is, whenever the verifiers
send the same polarized state (i.e., xi = yi), they get Ψ
+
(i.e., z = 0) with probability 1/2, Ψ− (i.e., z = 1) with
zero probability, and an inconclusive outcome with prob-
ability 1/2. For different polarized states (i.e., xi 6= yi),
they get Ψ+ with zero probability, Ψ− with probabil-
ity 1/2, and an inconclusive outcome with probability
1/2. Therefore, the verifiers will always agree with the
honest prover if nth ≤ m/2 is chosen. In this case, the
protocol is perfectly complete in the asymptotic limit.
III. SECURITY OF QUBIT PROTOCOL
From a prepare & measure perspective, the basic idea
of our protocol is to have the prover guess the XOR of the
verifiers’ bit values. That is, in each round of the protocol
the prover is given a random joint state ωb,x⊗ω′b,y and is
supposed to guess the underlying x⊕ y. The main secu-
rity principle of Protocol I is that the best measurement
(i.e., one that gives the highest guessing probability) is
necessarily an entangling measurement, which according
to our security model is only possible at the claimed po-
sition pos∗. As we will soon see below, LOCC adversaries
(due to their limited measurement possibilities) can only
4guess x⊕ y with at most probability 3/4.
To start with, the most general strategy is to maxi-
mize the guessing probability over all two-qubit positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) operators {Πz}z=0,1,∅
constrained to an average quantum channel loss parame-
ter (denoted by η). Mathematically, the maximum guess-
ing probability is given by
Pmaxguess(η) := max{Πz}z
1
2
Tr [ρ0Π0 + ρ1Π1]
η
, (1)
where
ρ0 :=
1
4
∑
b,x,y
s.t. x⊕y=0
ωb,x ⊗ ω′b,y, ρ1 :=
1
4
∑
b,x,y
s.t. x⊕y=1
ωb,x ⊗ ω′b,y,
and Tr[ρiΠ∅] = 1 − η for i = 0, 1. Note that for η =
1, Eq. (1) is given by the Helstrom’s bound [22], i.e.,
Pmaxguess(1) = 1/2 + ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1/4 = 3/4.
In the case of dishonest LOCC prover(s), the maximum
guessing probability is
Pmaxguess(η|LOCC) := max{ΠLOCCz }z
1
2
Tr [ρ0Π0 + ρ1Π1]
η
, (2)
where the maximization is now taken over all two-
qubit LOCC measurements. This maximization problem
is however difficult to solve as the mathematical char-
acterization of LOCC measurements is highly complex
(even for two-qubit measurements with one round of
communication). To overcome this problem, we use a
circuitous approach based on positive partial transpose
(PPT) measurements which admit two advantages over
LOCC measurements. First, the set of LOCC measure-
ments is a proper subset of PPT measurements, which
means the guessing probability taken over all PPT mea-
surements is necessarily an upper bound on Eq. (2), i.e.,
Pmaxguess(η|PTT) ≥ Pmaxguess(η|LOCC). Second, we may refor-
mulate the maximization of Pmaxguess(η|PTT) as a semidef-
inite program (SDP) [23], where the optimization is
taken over all two-qubit positive operators satisfying the
PPT condition (which in turn is represented by a set
of linear and positive semidefinite conditions) [24, 25].
More concretely, we may express the maximization of
ηPmaxguess(η|PTT) (for a fixed η) as
maximize :
1
2
Tr [ρ0Π0 + ρ1Π1]
subject to : Π0 + Π1 + Π∅ = 1,
Tr[ρiΠ∅] = 1− η, i = 0, 1
ΠTBk  0, k = 0, 1,∅,
where TB means the partial transpose with respect to
the measurement on the second qubit. The optimal so-
lution to the above SDP (primal program) is 3/4η (see
Appendix A 2), which implies the guessing probability
for LOCC adversaries is upper bounded by
Pmaxguess(η|LOCC) ≤
3
4
. (3)
Interestingly, we see that Pmaxguess(η|LOCC) is bounded by
a constant term that is independent of the detection effi-
ciency η. In fact, it can be shown that this bound is tight,
i.e., there exists a LOCC measurement that reaches the
PPT bound for any η. To show this, suppose that there
are two adversaries, E1 and E2, who are positioned next
to V1 and V2, respectively. Furthermore, suppose that
they share a source of shared randomness, λ, which takes
value from {0, 1} with probabilities Pr[λ = 0] = 1 − η
and Pr[λ = 1] = η, respectively. Now, in each round of
the protocol, if λ = 1, the adversaries measure their re-
spective qubits in the diagonal basis X and exchange the
measurement outcomes. Then, they compute the XOR
of their outcomes and send it to the verifiers. If λ = 0,
they jointly report no detection. Using this measurement
strategy, it can be easily verified that the guessing prob-
ability is 3/4 for any detection efficiency. Alternatively,
the upper bound can also be reached by using the Y ba-
sis, or using a statistical mixture of X and Y bases with
the aid of additional shared randomness.
From the above, it is clear that no coalition of LOCC
adversaries can correctly predict x ⊕ y even if η is arbi-
trarily small. Coupled with the earlier example that an
honest prover (who is at the claimed position and us-
ing linear optics) is able to correctly predict x ⊕ y for
η ≤ 1/2, it follows that a conclusive verification of the
prover’s geographical position is equivalent to checking
if the expected error rate is smaller than the minimum
LOCC error rate, δLOCC := 1− Pmaxguess(η|LOCC) = 1/4.
Before we present the security of Protocol I, let us first
briefly explain and define what it means for the proto-
col to be secure. The security of a generic QPV protocol
is generally analyzed using two conditions, namely the
completeness condition and the soundness condition [1].
The completeness condition, roughly speaking, is a mea-
sure of how often the protocol will agree with an hon-
est prover. Note that in the preceding section, we have
already shown (using an ideal optical model) that Pro-
tocol I is perfectly complete in the asymptotic limit for
nth ≤ m/2. The soundness condition, which we will be
analyzing in more detail below, is a conservative mea-
sure of how often the protocol will agree with a coalition
of adversaries. More precisely, the soundness condition
(adapted to our security model) is defined as
Definition 1 (Soundness). The protocol is said to
be ε-sound if for any coalition of LOCC adversaries
E1, E2, E3, . . . , at positions pos
′
1, pos
′
2, pos
′
3, . . . 6= pos∗
and using resources only at these positions, the verifiers
agree with probability at most ε.
The goal of the security analysis is to compute an up-
per bound on the soundness error, ε, in terms of the pro-
tocol parameters, i.e., the tolerated number of detection
events, nth, and the tolerated error rate, δth.
Result 1 (Security with qubits). Given nth and δth, the
protocol is εqubit-sound against LOCC adversaries with
εqubit ≤ e−2nth(1/4−δth)2 . (4)
5Proof sketch. The soundness of the protocol is obtained
by asking what is the maximum probability that the
verifiers agree with the adversaries. In what follows, for
brevity reasons, we will denote the event that the proto-
col passes the quota check by Ωqc, and omit the condi-
tioning on LOCC attacks (since this is clear in the con-
text). First, we note that the soundness error is upper
bounded by the probability that the verifiers agree with
adversaries conditioned on Ωqc, i.e.,
εqubit = Pr[Ωqc] Pr[Y|Ωqc] + Pr[Ωcqc] Pr[Y|Ωcqc]
≤ Pr[Y|Ωqc],
where we used Pr[Ωqc] ≤ 1 and Pr[Y|Ωcqc] = 0 to get
the inequality. Next, we note that the protocol outputs Y
only if the measured error rate δˆtest is less than or equal
to the tolerated error rate δth. This gives
εqubit ≤ Pr[Y|Ωqc] = Pr[δˆtest ≤ δth|Ωqc].
The above probability term can be modeled by a
Bernoulli experiment with nth trials. More precisely, for
each element in Z ′, let Wˆi be an indicator random vari-
able taking values in {0, 1}, where 0 means no error and
1 means otherwise. Let δˆtest =
∑nth
i=1 Wˆi/nth, then the
probability of E[δˆtest] − δˆtest ≥ β for some β > 0 is
bounded by the Hoeffding’s inequality [26]:
Pr[E[δˆtest]− δˆtest ≥ β] ≤ e−2nthβ2 .
Finally, by setting E[δˆtest] = δLOCC, and β = 1/4 − δth,
we have
εqubit ≤ Pr[δth ≥ δˆtest|Ωqc] ≤ e−2nth(1/4−δth)2 .
From the above, we see that the soundness error is
exponentially small in nth (1/4− δth). This means that
Protocol I can be made highly reliable by choosing a
large nth and a stringent error threshold (i.e., a small
δth). More importantly, the soundness error is indepen-
dent of the detection rate, which means that Protocol I
is secure against arbitrary quantum channel loss.
IV. DECOY-STATE METHOD
In Protocol I we have assumed that the verifiers are
able to reliably prepare ideal qubit states. However in
practice, this assumption is unrealistic as it requires true
single-photon sources. A more practical option is to use
weak laser sources, which are good approximations of
probabilistic single-photon sources. More concretely, the
output of a laser with intensity µ = |α|2 is described
by a coherent state, |α〉 = e−µ/2∑n=0 αn/√n!|n〉, where{|n〉}n is the photon number (Fock) basis. Assuming that
the laser is phase randomized, the photon number of each
output state follows a Poisson distribution with its mean
given by the laser’s intensity [27]. In this case, the output
state is described by
ρlaser =
1
2pi
2pi∫
0
dθ||α|eiθ〉〈|α|eiθ| =
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
e−µ|n〉〈n|,
where θ is the phase of the state and |n〉〈n| is the
density matrix of the n-photon state. This means that
in each round, the laser source emits a vacuum state
with probability e−µ, a single photon state with prob-
ability µe−µ, and a multi-photon state with probability
1− (1 +µ)e−µ. Thus, we may think of weak laser sources
as probabilistic single-photon sources if the laser inten-
sity is sufficiently small.
However, in the case of QPV, the non-vanishing multi-
photon probability is a major security issue, especially
when the quantum channel loss is high. In particular, col-
luding adversaries can postselect on laser pulses with 3
photons or more and perform unambiguous state discrim-
ination to determine the verifier’s basis and bit informa-
tion with success probability ≥ 1/2 [28]. If the quantum
channel loss is high enough, then it is not hard to see
that QPV is reduced to the classical version (with clas-
sical challenges) when all n < 3 laser pulses are blocked
and returned as empty detections. Importantly, this im-
plies that the security of QPV with weak laser sources is
not independent of the quantum channel loss.
In the following, we will show that QPV with weak
laser sources is still highly robust against quantum chan-
nel loss, tolerating up to 47 dB loss assuming realistic
parameters. The central idea is to use the decoy state
method [18] to estimate the number of single-photon de-
tections, i.e., the number of instances in which both veri-
fiers send single-photon states and a successful BSM out-
come is announced (denoted by s1,1), and the number
of errors in these single-photon detections (denoted by
r1,1) [29, 30]. Then by using these estimates, the veri-
fiers can verify the position of the prover by checking if
the estimated single-photon error rate is smaller than the
tolerated error rate (as in Protocol I).
We consider a decoy-state method with three intensi-
ties, I := {µ1, µ2, µ3}, where µ1 > µ2 + µ3 and µ2 >
µ3 ≥ 0. The relevant estimates are (1) a lower bound on
s1,1 and (2) an upper bound on r1,1, which we denote by
random variables sˆlb1,1 and rˆ
ub
1,1, respectively. Accordingly,
this means that there are two possible statistical errors,
one due to the estimation of s1,1 and the other due to
the estimation of r1,1. The reliability of these estimates
is parameterized by a non-negative security parameter,
ν. Below we present the protocol in more detail.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
A crucial step in the above security analysis of Proto-
col I is that the verifiers are able to directly observe s1,1
and r1,1 and check if the protocol has sufficient statis-
tics, i.e., s1,1 ≥ nth, and if the verification is correct or
6Protocol with decoy-state method
1. Preparation. The prepare & measurement phase is
carried out i = 1, 2, . . . ,m times, one after the other. Like
in the qubit protocol, the verifiers agree on a random
basis choice bi using the private classical channel, and
they each independently generate a random bit. For the
decoy-state method, they each select an intensity value
from I := {µ1, µ2, µ3} with probabilities pµ1 , pµ2 , and pµ3 ,
respectively. We write gi and hi to denote their respective
intensity choices for each ith round. Finally, the verifiers each
prepare a weak laser pulse based on their generated values
and send the encoded laser pulse to the prover.
2. Measurement. The prover makes an entangling mea-
surement on the laser pulses and report the outcome,
zi ∈ {0, 1,∅}, back to the verifiers.
3. Quota check. Similar to the qubit protocol, the verifiers
only accept the measurement outcomes if they are consistent
with the timing constraints. If one of the outcomes does not
meet the timing constraint or the verifiers receive different
outcomes, the protocol aborts and the verifiers output N. If the
protocol does not abort at the end of the measurement phase,
the verifiers perform a quota check. Setting nu,vobs = |Zu,v| for
u, v = µ1, µ2, µ3 and nobs =
∑
u,v n
u,v
obs, the verifiers compute
a lower bound on s1,1 (see Appendix B 2) using
sˆlb1,1=
⌊
(µ21−µ23)(µ1−µ3)γ2 − (µ22−µ23)(µ2−µ3)γ1
(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)2(µ1 − µ2)
⌋
, (5)
where
γ1 := χ
µ1,µ1 + χµ3,µ3 − χµ1,µ3 − χµ3,µ1
+ ν
1
2 n
1
2
obs (ξ
µ1,µ1 + ξµ3,µ3 + 2ξµ1,µ3) ,
γ2 := χ
µ2,µ2 + χµ3,µ3 − χµ2,µ3 − χµ3,µ2
− ν 12 n
1
2
obs (ξ
µ2,µ2 + ξµ3,µ3 + 2ξµ2,µ3) ,
with ξu,v := exp(u + v)p−1u p
−1
v and χ
u,v := ξu,vnu,vobs for all
u, v ∈ I. The verifiers proceed to the verification step if
slb1,1 ≥ nth,
otherwise they abort the protocol and output N.
5. Verification. The verifiers first calculate the number of
errors (denoted by mu,vobs) in each Zu,v and the total number
of errors, mobs =
∑
u,vm
u,v
obs. Then, they compute an upper
bound on r1,1 using
rˆub1,1 = min
{⌈
γ3
(µ2 − µ3)2
⌉
,
⌈
sˆlb1,1
2
⌉}
(6)
where
γ3 := ζ
µ2,µ2 + ζµ3,µ3 − ζµ2,µ3 − ζµ3,µ2
+ ν
1
2m
1
2
obs (ξ
µ2,µ2 + ξµ3,µ3 + 2ξµ2,µ3) .
with ζu,v := ξu,vmu,vobs. Finally, the verifiers agree with the
prover and output Y if
δˆdecoytest =
rˆub1,1
sˆlb1,1
≤ δth,
Otherwise, they output N.
Protocol II. QPV with decoy state method.
not, i.e., r1,1/s1,1 ≤ δth. However, in the case of weak
laser sources, the direct observation of s1,1 and r1,1 is
not possible as the verifiers do not know which of the
successful BSM detections are due to single-photon emis-
sions. To overcome this issue, Protocol II uses the decoy-
state method as a means to construct random one-sided
intervals for s1,1 and r1,1. In particular, the intervals sˆ
lb
1,1
and rˆub1,1, as specified in Eqs. (5) and (6), are constructed
to capture s1,1 and r1,1 with very high probability in each
run of the protocol.
The key point here is that although the decoy-state
method can be made very reliable (i.e., by choosing a
large ν), there is still a non-vanishing probability that
the intervals will fail to capture s1,1 and r1,1 in the right
direction. That is, there could be instances of the proto-
col in which the computed intervals are wrong and yet the
verifiers agree with the adversaries. In terms of the secu-
rity analysis, this means that there is a strictly non-zero
probability that the verifiers will agree with the adver-
saries, thereby implying an additional source of sound-
ness errors. Here, it is important to emphasize that this
source of soundness error (which is due to the uncertain-
ties in the decoy-state method) is fundamentally differ-
ent from the soundness error captured by Eq. (4), which
is induced by the uncertainty in the error rate distribu-
tion. Below, we show that the soundness error of Proto-
col II is the same as Protocol I except for an additive error
term that is due to the statistical errors of the decoy-state
method used.
Result 2 (Security with weak laser sources). Given
{µ1, µ2, µ3}, {pu×pv}u,v, nth, δth, and ν, the protocol is
εdecoy-sound with
εdecoy < εqubit + 21 + 2, (7)
where 1 := 1− (1− e−2ν)7 and 2 := 1− (1− e−2ν)4.
Proof sketch. Here, we start from a general scenario and
assume that the adversaries use s1,1 > nth with proba-
bility κ and s1,1 ≤ nth with probability 1− κ. Note that
this choice of partitioning is not restrictive (since κ is not
fixed) and is merely used to faciliate the security analy-
sis. Let the event s1,1 > nth be denoted by Θ, then the
soundness error can be written as
εdecoy = 1− κPr [N|Θ]− (1− κ) Pr [N|Θc] .
By conditioning on Ωqc, we further get
εdecoy = κPr[Ωqc|Θ] (1− Pr [N|Θ,Ωqc])
+(1− κ) Pr[Ωqc|Θc] (1− Pr [N|Θc,Ωqc]) .
7The above can be simplified by setting Pr [N|Θc,Ωqc] = 0
and κ, Pr[Ωqc|Θ] ≤ 1 to get a bound that is independent
of κ (which is unknown),
εdecoy < 1− Pr [N|Θ,Ωqc] + Pr[Ωqc|Θc]. (8)
Now, let us focus on the event Θ, where there are two
parts to it. The first part consists in bounding the prob-
ability that rˆ1,1/s1,1 > δth. This is given by Eq. (4) with
nth replaced by s1,1: Pr[rˆ1,1/s1,1 > δth] > 1 − ε′qubit,
where we used ε′qubit to remind that s1,1 has been used
instead of nth. Then from ε
′
qubit < εqubit , we have
Pr[rˆ1,1/s1,1 > δth] > 1− εqubit, (9)
which is now expressed in terms of the protocol pa-
rameters. The second part consists in bounding the
reliability of the decoy-state method. Recall that the
goal is to provide a lower bound on s1,1 and an up-
per bound on rˆ1,1 = r1,1 (i.e., for a given realization
of rˆ1,1). These bounds are given by sˆ
lb
1,1 and rˆ
ub
1,1, which
are one-sided interval estimates. Suppose for the moment
the reliability of these estimates are known, i.e., Pr[s1,1
> sˆlb1,1] > 1 − 1 and Pr[r1,1 < rˆub1,1|rˆ1,1 = r1,1] >
1 − 2. Then, by taking the ratio distribution, we can
construct an one-sided interval for the single-photon er-
ror rate,
Pr
[
r1,1/s1,1 < rˆ
ub
1,1/sˆ
lb
1,1|rˆ1,1 = r1,1
]
> (1− 1)(1− 2).
(10)
Operationally, this means that given s1,1 and r1,1, the
decoy-state method will output a single-photon error rate
estimate, rˆub1,1/sˆ
lb
1,1, that is larger than the true single-
photon error rate r1,1/s1,1 with probability greater than
(1 − 1)(1 − 2). Notice that the probability statement
is about the computed interval and not about the true
single-photon error rate.
Now it remains to put everything together. First, we
have that the probability of rejection conditioned on Θ
is given by
Pr [N|Θ,Ωqc] = Pr[δth < rˆub1,1/sˆlb1,1|Θ,Ωqc],
which is essentially Eq. (10) conditioned on the event
rˆ1,1 > dδths1,1e. More precisely, we have Pr [N|Θ,Ωqc] =
Pr[rˆ1,1 > dδths1,1e|Θ] Pr[r1,1/s1,1 < rˆub1,1/sˆlb1,1|rˆ1,1 = r1,1],
which together with Eq. (9) implies
Pr [N|Θ,Ωqc] > (1− 1)(1− 2)(1− εqubit).
Plugging this in Eq. (8), we thus get
εdecoy < 1− (1− 1)(1− 2) + εqubit + Pr[Ωqc|Θc]
< 1− (1− 1)(1− 2) + εqubit + 1
< 21 + 2 + εqubit,
where in the second inequality we used Pr[Ωqc|Θc] ≤ 1.
Finally, in Appendix B 2 we show that the statistical
errors 1 and 2 can be parameterized using a fixed secu-
rity constant, ν, giving
1 = 1− (1− e−2ν)7, 2 = 1− (1− e−2ν)4,
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FIG. 3. The upper bound of the estimated single-
photon error rate versus overall loss between Alice
and Bob. The simulation assumes a baseline QBER of
0.1%. The the detectors are assumed to have an efficiency
of 64% and a dark count rate of 2.5 × 10−6. The starting
cut-off point is about 6.8 dB, which is the total loss in the
BSM. The numerical results are obtained using N = 10x with
x = 10, 11, 12, 13 (from left to right).
which concludes our proof sketch.
A way to evaluate the feasibility of our protocol is to
look for the loss point (in dB) at which the error rate,
rˆub1,1/sˆ
lb
1,1, is greater than 1/4. To this end, we consider
a symmetric photonic implementation where the prover
is positioned at the center between the verifiers, i.e., see
Fig. (1). The implementation is based on polarized pho-
tons, linear optical elements and threshold detectors. Fol-
lowing standard channel error models for photonic quan-
tum communication (e.g., see Ref. [29]), we assume two
sources of error, namely polarization misalignment errors
and background noise. In this case, the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) is made up of two components: a baseline
error rate (polarization misalignment errors) and a loss-
dependent error rate (due to detector dark counts). Ev-
idently in our consideration, the limit on the amount of
tolerable loss is largely determined by the detector dark
count rate. For the simulation, we borrow experimental
parameters from a recent MDI-QKD experiment [31]: the
baseline error rate is fixed to 0.1% and the detectors (with
64% efficiency) are assumed to have a dark count rate of
2.5 × 10−6. Also, the security parameter of the decoy-
state method to fixed to ν = 10, giving an overall error
probability of ∼ 10−8. In Fig. (3), we plot rˆub1,1/sˆlb1,1 for
N = 10x with x = 10, 11, 12, 13 against the overall quan-
tum channel loss (dB). From the simulation, we see that
our protocol is able to tolerate up to about 47 dB loss
with weak laser sources.
8VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In the above, we have presented a time-reversed entan-
glement swapping QPV protocol that is highly robust
against detection losses. Using a proof technique from
Refs. [24, 25], we first showed that Protocol I (assum-
ing ideal BB84 qubits) is secure against arbitrary local
operations and classical communication (LOCC) attacks
for any quantum channel loss. In particular, the sound-
ness error of the protocol is shown to be independent
of the overall detection loss and is exponentially small
in the number of rounds with conclusive measurement
outcomes. This is in contrast to the widely studied BB84
QPV protocol, which is insecure when the quantum chan-
nel loss is ≥ 1/2 assuming LOCC attacks [14]. In Section
IV, we extended Protocol I to weak laser sources using a
practical decoy-state method with three intensities (de-
noted by Protocol II). We found that the soundness error
of Protocol II only degrades by an additive error term
that is dependent on the reliability of the underlying
decoy-state method. In addition, we performed numer-
ical simulations using realistic experimental conditions
and found that secure position verification is possible up
to about 47 dB loss.
Evidently, our proposed protocol is not the complete
solution to practical QPV. In particular, what we have
addressed here is only the overall detection loss assuming
the verifiers are able to accurately prepare their quan-
tum states. To this end, it would be useful to investigate
the impact of state preparation errors, especially con-
sidering the fact that such errors are known to severely
degrade the security performance of quantum key distri-
bution [32]. One possible solution is to adopt the notion
of loss-tolerant quantum cryptography [33] and employ
mismatched basis statistics to guarantee the loss-tolerant
property of our protocol in the presence of state prepa-
ration errors. Another interesting line of research would
be to look at the semi-device-independent security of our
protocol assuming that the dimensions of the verifier’s
quantum challenges (states) are fixed. Several results
have been obtained in this direction for measurement-
device-independent QKD [34, 35], which suggests that
similar conclusions could hold for our QPV protocol.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was performed at Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory (ORNL), operated by UT-Battelle for the U.S.
Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC05-
00OR22725. The authors acknowledge support from
ORNL laboratory directed research and development
program (LDRD), the U.S. Department of Energy Cy-
bersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) pro-
gram program under contract M614000329, and the U.S.
Office of Naval Research (ONR).
Appendix A: Details of semidefinite program
1. SDP: preliminaries
In order for us to provide a more precise description
of our semidefinite programs, we would need to intro-
duce a few mathematical notations; some of which may
be different from those used in the main text. We let
V1 and V2 complex Hilbert spaces be denoted by A and
B, respectively. The set of linear operators, Hermitian
operators and positive semidefinite operators acting on
the composite Hilbert space are written as L(A ⊗ B),
Herm(A ⊗ B) and Pos(A ⊗ B), respectively. Further-
more, we write Q  0 to indicate that Q is posi-
tive semidefinite. The set of density operators corre-
sponding to the verifiers’ quantum systems is defined as
D(A ⊗ B) := {ρ ∈ Pos(A ⊗ B) : Tr[ρ] = 1}. Addition-
ally, we would require the partial transpose operation,
TB = IL(A) ⊗ T , which performs the transpose opera-
tion, T , on V2’s Hilbert space. Accordingly, the set of
positive partial transpose (PPT) operators is defined as
PPT(A : B) := {Q : TB(Q)  0, Q ∈ Pos(A⊗ B)}. Also,
we denote a diagonal matrix by Q = diag[λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4].
2. Optimal guessing probabilities
As mentioned in the main text, the bound for PPT
measurements can be analytically solved using convex
optimization techniques, namely, semidefinite program-
ming [23]. More specifically, the idea is to find feasible
analytical solutions for the primal and dual programs,
which provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal
value (i.e., the weak duality principle). If the solutions
lead to values that coincide, then we say that the optimal
solution for the semidefinite program is found. That is,
by the strong duality principle, the duality gap is zero. In
the following, we will show that the considered semidefi-
nite programs have zero duality gaps.
Result 3. (Optimal guessing probability for PPT
measurements). The maximum probability of discrim-
inating ρ0 and ρ1 using measurements {Π0,Π1,Π∅} ∈
PPT(A⊗ B) for any conclusive rate η ∈ (0, 1] is
Pmaxguess(·|PPT) =
3
4
(A1)
Proof sketch. The primal program for PPT measure-
ments is given as
Primal program (PPT)
maximize :
1
2
Tr [ρ0Π0 + ρ1Π1]
subject to : Π0 + Π1 + Π∅ = 1A⊗B
Tr [ρiΠ∅] = 1− η, i = 0, 1
Πk ∈ PPT(A : B), k = 0, 1,∅,
9and the corresponding dual program is
Dual program (PPT)
minimize : Tr [Y ]− (1− η)γ
subject to : 2 (Y − TB(Qi))− ρi  0, i = 0, 1
4 (Y − TB(Q2))− γ1L(A⊗B)  0
Y ∈ Herm(A⊗ B)
Qi ∈ Pos(A⊗ B), i = 0, 1, 2
γ ∈ R.
To prove Eq. (A1), we need to construct feasible so-
lutions for the primal and dual programs and show that
their optimization values are identical. For the primal
program, a feasible solution is
Π˜0 =
1
2
η 0 0 00 η η 00 η η 0
0 0 0 η
 , Π˜0 = 1
2
η 0 0 00 η −η 00 −η η 0
0 0 0 η

Π˜∅ = diag [1− η, 1− η, 1− η, 1− η] .
Using this solution, we get ηPmaxguess(η|PPT) ≥ 3η/4. For
the dual program, a feasible solution is
Y˜ =
3
16
1L(A⊗B), γ˜ =
3
4
,
Q0 =
1
16
 1 0 0 −10 0 0 00 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1
 , Q1 = 1
16
1 0 0 10 0 0 00 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 ,
Q2 = 0L(A⊗B),
which gives ηPmaxguess(η|PPT) ≤ 3η/4. Putting everything
together, the obtained optimal values give Eq. (A1).
Appendix B: Details of decoy-state method
Here, we provide the details for the bounds from the
decoy-state analysis presented in the main text. The anal-
ysis is mainly based on Ref. [30].
1. Decoy-state method: preliminaries
Our decoy-state method consists in both verifiers ran-
domly setting the intensities of their respective laser
pulses to one of the three intensity levels, I = {µ1, µ2, µ3}
where µ1 > µ2 + µ3 and µ2 > µ3 ≥ 0. To analyze the
finite-size effects of the decoy-state method, we consider
an equivalent protocol, where V1 (V2) has the ability to
send k-photon (l-photon) states, and they only decide on
the choice of the average photon-number after the prover
announces a successful measurement. In what follows,
we will first introduce basic notations for the decoy-state
analysis and then provide the relevant bounds for s1,1
and r1,1.
Let sk,l be the number of successful measurements an-
nounced by the prover given that V1 has sent k-photon
states and V2 has sent m-photon states. In this case, it
is not hard to see that
∑∞
k,l=0 sk,l =
∑
u,v n
u,v = n is
the total number of detections, where nu,v is the num-
ber of detections assigned to intensity settings u and v.
Furthermore, we expect the size of nu,v to be
n˜u,v =
∞∑
k,l=0
pu,v|k,lsk,l, (B1)
where pu,v|k,l is the conditional probability of choosing
the intensity settings u and v given that V1 sent a k-
photon state and V2 sent a l-photon state. More for-
mally, the difference between the expected value (n˜u,v)
and the observed value (nu,v) can be quantified by using
the Hoeffding’s inequality [26]:
|n˜u,v − nu,v| < ∆(n, 1), (B2)
where ∆(n, 1) :=
√
n/2 log(1/1). The same statistical
inequality can also be made for the expected number of
errors and the observed number of errors for any pair
of intensity settings. Let rk,l be the number of errors
associated with sk,l, m =
∑∞
k,l=0 rk,l be the total number
of errors, and
m˜u,v =
∞∑
k,l=0
pu,v|k,lrk,l, (B3)
be the expected number of errors assigned to intensity
settings u and v. Then, the difference between m˜u,v and
mu,v is given by
|m˜u,v −mu,v| < ∆(m, 2), (B4)
which holds with probability at least 1− 22.
A central ingredient in Eqs. (B1) and (B3) is the prob-
ability of choosing intensities u, v given k, l photons (i.e.,
pu,v|k,l), which is not directly accessible in Protocol II.
To estimate this quantity, we note that with Bayes’ rule,
for all u and v, we have
pu,v|k,l =
pu,v
τk,l
pk,l|u,v =
pu,v
τk,l
e−(u+v)ukvl
k!l!
, (B5)
where pu,v denotes the probability that V1 chooses inten-
sity u and V2 chooses intensity v, and
τk,l :=
∑
u,v
pu,ve
−(u+v)u
kvl
k!l!
, (B6)
is the probability that V1 prepares a k-photon state and
V2 prepares a l-photon state.
10
2. Estimation of s1,1 and r1,1
Next, we discuss how to calculate s1,1. This is done by
exploiting the structure of Eq. (B1) and following the
approach proposed by Refs. [29, 30]. The estimation
method is mainly based on Gaussian elimination. For
brevity, let ξu,v := exp(u + v)p−1u p
−1
v for all u, v ∈ I,
then we have s1,1 ≥ slb1,1 where
slb1,1 =
⌊
(µ21 − µ23)(µ1 − µ3)γ′2 − (µ22 − µ23)(µ2 − µ3)γ′1
(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)2(µ1 − µ2)
⌋
,
(B7)
and
γ′1 := ξ
µ1,µ1 n˜µ1,µ1 + ξµ3,µ3 n˜µ3,µ3
− ξµ1,µ3 n˜µ1,µ3 − ξµ3,µ1 n˜µ3,µ1 , (B8)
γ′2 := ξ
µ2,µ2 n˜µ2,µ2 + ξµ3,µ3 n˜µ3,µ3
− ξµ2,µ3 n˜µ2,µ3 − ξµ3,µ2 n˜µ3,µ2 . (B9)
An upper bound on the number of errors associated with
the single-photon detection events is given in Refs [29, 30]
rub1,1 = min
{⌈
γ′3
(µ2 − µ3)2
⌉
,
⌈
slb1,1
2
⌉}
(B10)
where
γ′3 := ξ
µ2,µ2m˜µ2,µ2 + ξµ3,µ3m˜µ3,µ3
− ξµ2,µ3m˜µ2,µ3 − ξµ3,µ2m˜µ3,µ2 . (B11)
At this point, Eqs. (B7) and (B10) are given in terms
of n˜u,v and m˜u,v, which are expected values. To rewrite
the equations in terms of the observed values, we use
Eqs. (B2) and (B4) to get
nu,v −√νn < n˜u,v < nu,v +√νn, (B12)
mu,v −√νm < m˜u,v < mu,v +√νm, (B13)
for all u, v ∈ I. Thus for a given security parameter ν > 0,
the error probability for these inequalities is exp(−2ν).
In other words, each of the above inequalities holds with
probability at least 1 − exp(−2ν). Note that Eqs. (B7)
and (B10) use 7 estimators and 4 estimators, respectively.
Finally, by applying Eqs. (B12) and (B13) to Eqs. (B7)
and (B10), we arrive at the main equations for Proto-
col II, Eqs. (5) and (6).
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